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A skillful program committee chooses titles for conference papers that
deceive in their simplicity, which on close inspection turn out not to be
simple at all, and which raise more questions than an author can hope to answer
in the 5000 words that they allot to it. They thus lay the groundwork for future
research and for .future conferences. Certainly the title of this paper is de
ceptively simple, yet cloaks a problem that goes to the heart of political theory:
how should human beings organi?.P thPir cnlle~tive endeavors, especially those
t.hnt- 1'.'cqt.ti_rc gove1:nment-al action, so. as to best achieve their d:l.verse and often
conflicting objectives?
The recent historical or.i.gins of the question posed in the title are clear
enough. There has been a running debate since the Second World War (with ante
cedents in the 1930s) over whether the world economy would be better se1:vE>rl by
full multilateralism or by regional groupings that "discriminate" in favor of
members and against non-members. This question arose especially with respect to
customs unions and free trade areas, where the principal instrument of discrim
But it also arose with respect to balance-of
payments policy (with the Sterling Area and the European Payments Union rep
resenting the leading examples of regional groupings) and, more recently and
more hypothetically. with respect to the range of common currencies--wh at is
ination was the import tariff.

the optimal area for a single currency? As usually posed, these questions con
cern groupings among nations. But similar questions, deriving from a different
starting point, have be.en asked with increasing force about the optimal provision
of public goods and services within nations, particularly those with a federal
structure, which have shown increasing strain in recent years in trying to pro
vide public goods both efficiently and with sufficient regard for local variations
in public desires.
Thus from a theoretical point of view the issue posed in the title goes
beyond possible regional relationships among nations. Put more generally, we
can ask what is the optimal c0mbination of communities, or regionst for an inte
grated area? In some cases t!-ie answer may involve regional groupings of existing
nations; in others it might involve several regions within existing nations.
But before proceeding further we should make a few distinctions about the
meaning of "integrated area."

-2Some Important Distinctions Concerning "Integration"
Although a detailed discussion of alternative forms of integration will
be covered elsewhere, several distinctions are necessary here before proceeding
to a discussion of optimal-integrated areas.

First "integration" can refer

to the legal and institutional relationships within a region in which economic
transactions take place. Or it can refer to the market relationships among
goods and factors within the region. This distinction becomes clear when we
imagine a nineteenth century laissez faire economy with no government barriers
to inter-regional transactions, but with markets not linked because of ignorance
or high transportation costs.

The regions would be integrated in the first

sense.

but not in the second.

This would be true even in the presence of a high degree
of inter-governmental coordination between the countries comprising the region.
If there are institntional or legal barriers to trade and capital movements.
on the other hand, markets of course cannot be fully integrated either, at
least in the sense of equal product and factor prices.

But these prices may

move in parallel with one another. indicating market integration at the margin,
i.e. high sensitivity to developments elsewhere in the region.
Before we return to this distinction between institutional and market
integration, it is useful to draw a second distinction, between integration
as state of affairs and integration as process. M'uch of the postwar debate
on regionalism vs globalism was concerned with process rather than with state·
of affairs~ the advocates of economic regionalism saw it as an effective route
to attain some other objective, either economic globalism or regional political
unification.

The universalism of the Bretton Woods Agreement and of the General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, both laid down in the 1940s, stood in sharp
contrast to the regionalism of the Sterling Area. the European Payments Union,
the European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Economic Community.
Each of the latter institutions was hotly resisted in their early s,tages, as
an undesirable retreat from the universalism which the architects o,f the postwar
international economic system hoped to achieve.

The regional institutions, for

their part, were rarely justified as ends in themselves, although occasionally
that strand of thought was present. Rather, they were regarded as superior means
to achieve more far-reaching ends.

Thus Robert Triffin argued persistently that

the European Payments Union, with its implied discriminatioh against the U.S.
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dollar, represented much the ~oGt effective way to achieve cur.re.ncy ccnvcL·~i
bility and to restore a truly multilatera l system of interna~ior. ~l payments •.!/
Like-minded countries with similar problems would move more ~-.ii 1r:'..y together
thnn they could either separately or when grouped with countries :2cing very
different problems. To try everything at once would stymie progress, as the
failure of the Internation al T~a:ie Organizatio n seemed to sugges~. On this
fo~mulation , the objective of beth part~es to thgn£~bate is the same, namely
a nultilatera l world economy; but judgments differ/on the best way to achieve it.
Unfortunate ly for clarity in the debate, another group, associaterl with
the name Jean Monnet, had quite different objectives, and sought to use th·:!
same L:~'.'truments of economic regionalism to attain their objective of region~l
political unification . So a confusion was introduced:_ the probability that
economic regionalism would eventually lead to economic universalism t-ms reduced
to the ext .:mt that it would lead to regional political integration .
Inter:;r::-.t:.on as a process involves establishin g a situation that is not in
long-run equilibrium : partial integration creates new problems which in turn
call for further integrative measures, and so on.'l:.. / One thing leads to another,
and eventually political integration captures the minds of the people. On the
first version of integration as process, success among a limited group of countries
breeds a willingness by others to join in, and eventually the regional approach
On the second version, it creates durable political bonds within
the region. In either of these frames of reference, the "optimal" region for
integration is that which best achieves the desired objective rapidly and
becomes global.

securely.
We return to integration ~s a state of affairs. Markets are integrated if
one price prevails for each product or factor, after allowance for transportat ion
costs. On this market formulation , the optimum integrated area is the wo:ld as
a whole, for any artificial interferenc e with price equilibrati on (except those
designed to eliminate market imperfectio ns) will ipso facto represent a source
of inefUcienc y in the allocation of resources. What then is the case for
regionalism ? It lies, I believe, not in the realm of private goods, but in the
realm of public or collective goods, where these are defined broadly to include
the nature of the economic regime itself, i.e. the system of property owners~ip,
of contrac L,

t}

~

risk-bearin g, and the like.

s~me i nciividu;:.ls may not want an

economic regime based on markets, and are willing to pay the economic price for

-4that decision.

Vie"Wed froo the perspective of public goods, "n:-gions" really

mean governmental jurisdictions, and the enquiry must begin with the functi0ns
of government.

The standard list calls on governments to prcvi~~ public goods,

to stabilize the level and growth of income, to redistribute income, and above
all to prov:f.de a regulatory framework for economic and social transa.ctions.
Whether a region is "optimal" t 1 ten depends on its optimal suitability for
performing these various functions.

"Optimality" means: best able to serve

the various social objectives, where "best"' is in the Pareto sense of not
permi.tting closer achievement of one objective without compromising the att~in
ment of some other objective.
The perspective adopted here thus renders irrelevant the classic distinr~fon
by Viner between trade-creating and trade-diverting customs unions, and their
analogues in the monetary arena.
in terms

o:

As Cooper and Hassell showed a decade ago,

"t:raight national income a unilateral tariff reduction dominates the

formation of a discriminatory trading bloc; the formation of customs unions
must therefore be r2.tionalized along different lines}../ Harry Johnson has provide<'..
a more general framework for regarding protection in general and customs unions
in particular as devices (perhaps inefficient ones) for the attainment of
public goods, i.e. features from which the public at large derivefl some s~tisfac
tion, whether- they be nationalism, redistribution of incorae, or a level of
industrial production above what could be sustained by the ope~ation of unimpeded
rr.arket forces,!!_/ In this context the formation of regional groupings on a dis
criminatory basis might represent the most efficient method for attaining a
given objective; but the res·:i:s woul<l have to be shown in each specific case,
for the general optimality of discriminatory trade or payments arrangements
cannot be assumed.
The Optimal Provision of Collective Goods
The optimal provision of public goods involves both technologi~al consider
ations aad the accommodation of public preferences.

We will first consider

the techaological side, which considerations generally (but not always) press
for enlargeraent of governmental jurisdiction, while accommodation of public
preferences generally (but not always) presses for relatively small govern
mental jur~~d!ctions.

-5Three technical factors have a bearing on the provision of public coods:
economies of scale, the presence of externali ties (including the important
special case in which some of the objects of regulatio n are mobile), and the
possibili ties for reducing economic disturban ces through integratin g markets.
We will take up each of these considera tions in turn, the last especiall y in
the context of economic stabiliza tion.
E~~no~i~s of Scale

Scale economies offer a tradition al argument for
increasin g the size of jurisdict ions, at least up to a point. Certain public
goods, especiall y those requiring for efficienc y a high degree of specializ ation,
experienc e strong economies of scale. Examples would be certain forms of
scientifi c research, public health, police investiga tory work, the penal system,
some aspects of national defense, and flood control and irrigatio n. Where
scale econ01nies are substanti al, the governme ntal jurisdict ion (or its
functiona l equivalen t in facilitie s shared among jurisdict ions) must be large
enough to encompass the scale required, or else its residents will either
enjoy lower quality services or pay more than is technical ly necessary for
tho.se services.
The optimum scale for governme ntal jurisdict ion will of course ·17ary from
public good to public good. Where jurisdict ions can be effective ly separated
alnng functiona l lines, they can be tailored to the requireme nts of each
different good. (Los Angeles and London both offer examples of urban areas with
many overlappi ng jurisdict ionsj drawn in part along functiona l lines.) Where
as a practical matter that is not possible, the choice of scale of a jurisdict ion
should (other things being equal) be governed by the minimum cost of the
package of public goods that is to be offered. Because of organiza tional,
manageri al, and informati onal costs, the optimal jurisdict ion will be well below
the global level.
External Effects

External effects arise when activitie s within one
jurisdict ion affect directly the welfare of residents of another jurisdict ion,
other than through market prices. External effects can be either positive,
as in the case of malarial control, or negative, as in the case of downstrea m
water pollution . In one respect, external effects can be thought of as a more
general case of economies (or diseconom ies) of scale: once a service (e.g. mal
arial control) is provided, the marginal cost of additiona l consumpti on (enjoy
ment) of that service is low or zero, and therefore the average cost to citizens

-6is lower, the larger the jurisdiction in terms of ta~~ble population.

It. is

worth while to preserve the distinction between the two considerations, hm-,cver.
since economies of scale normally refer to technical input-out relationships
in the production of a well-defined good or service, not to the consumption
effects.
A special kind of externality arises from the mobility of the objects
of policy action. Here the problem is that. the "public good" by community
preference may involve unwelcome restraints on certain elements of the com
munity, e.g. its business firms or its radio stations or its high income
members.

Activution of these regulatory or redistributional policies will

then drive the adversely affected parties out of a jurisdiction that is too
small relat.ive to their domain of mobility.

They will escape the onerous action

by leaving the jurisdiction in question.I/ To prevent this, the jurisdiction
must either inhibit the mobility of its residents or become la~ge enough to
encompass their entire domain of mobility.

The latter course does not necessarily

involve enlargement to the global level because as a practical matter persons
and firms are not globally mobile.
language, and culture

Considerations of economics, geography~

all limit the actual domain of mobility.

The mobility of factors beyond a government jurisdiction limits the
capacity of that jurisdiction to redistribute income.

The heavily taxed will

move out, and those who are subsidized will move in, both of which movements
undercut the fiscal viability of redistributional policies.

It is true that

even trade in goods and services will affect the rewards to factors of production,
as underlined in strong form by the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theorem concerning
factor-price-equalization.

But.the imposit';,n of ~ariffs can alter the free

trade distrib:.ition of income, and in any case the resulting factor rewards are
before allowance for income taxes, which can serve redistributive objectives.
It is factor mobility, not connnodity movement, that really limits the possibilities
for redistribution.
Similar considerations apply to attempts by jurisdictions to regulate
business activity, e.g. capital structure, financial disclosure, safety,
pollution, and so on.

Once the regulations go beyond what is acceptable to

I

the mobile firm, where "acceptability" will be influenced by the competitive
environment in which the firm operates, it will depart for a jurisdiction with
6/
less onerous regulations.-

-7Economic Stabilization.

A third consideration for the optimal siz~

of an integrated region concerns the objective of economic stabilization
on the assumption that policy measures to stabilize the level of income
or employment are uncertain in effect or costly to use.

Under these cir

cumstances, any arrangement that reduces the macro-economic disturbances
to the region in question will be beneficial.

For a given region, macro

economic disturbances (that is, disturbances that in the absence of
countervailing action would alter perceptibly the level of aggregate
income or employment) can arise either within the region or from outside
it.

Its economy will respond to these disturbances in some well-defined

way, which depends among other things on the openness of the region, and
it can take steps to compensate for the disturbance with various regional
instruments of policy, whose impact also depends on the structure of the
regional economy.
How then should the boundaries of a region be drawn from the view
point of maximizing the stability of the regional economy?

By boundaries

we_ mean here the limits of application of tariffs or direct controls on
inter-regional transactions and/or a single currency or fixed exchange
rates between currencies within the region.
First consider the disturbances that create economic instability.
If internal disturbances are low compared with those emanating from outside the region, the region should perhaps insulate itself from other regions,
using the devices indicated above.

This is analogous to risk-splitting in

the writing of insurance: a low risk group can gain by separating itself
from the rest.

In contrast, if internal disturbances are large relative

to those emanating from outside the region, the region may gain by amalga
mating with other regions and thus in effect export some of its distur
bances to the larger area.

Finally, if the relative importance of distur

bances originating inside the region is about the same as those originating
outside, but the disturbances have different patterns, i.e. are less than
perfectly correlated, then the interests of each of two regions will gen
erally be well served by joining, since the disturbances will partially
offset one another and produce a lower net disturbance in both regions;
that is, the regions will engage in risk-spreading rather than in risk
splitting by joining one another in a common region, analogous to enlarging
7/
an insurance pool.-
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If we now take the net dis-::urban~e as given, re<luced as

l.L n,.uy hov<'

been through export or through import of partially offsetting distur-·
bances, we can ask how much damage it will do to the region of our inter
est, and how the region may take policy action to mitigate the remaining
damage.

Mundell has pointed out that if factor mobility is high within a
region, adjustment to some disturbances can take place quite smoothly, as

shifts in demand among goods lead to prompt re-employment of any redundant
factors. Kenen has made a related point in emphasizing the importance of
diversity in an economy, both to reduce the net disturbance through mutually
offsetting of uncorrelated disturbances, and to spread the impact widely
8/
throughout an economy,thereby reducing the social cost.In Mundell's
formulation, stabilization requirements alone imply as small an area as
possible (each with its own floating currency), for that leads as close as
possible to a regime of complete price flexibility, and.the market will
always clear.

Efficiency in the use of money leads Mundell's optimum cur

rency area to stop far short of this atomism.

Kenen's emphasis on distur

bances suggests that even in the realm of stabilization alone the optimum
area may be far larger than Mundell's argument implies.2/
Moreover, extremely open (small) economies may find themselves bereft
of useful instruments of policy to deal with disturbances. McKinnon has
suggested that money illusion in an open economy may diminish to the point
at which fluctuations in the exchange rate of the region's currency may
cease to be effective in influencing patterns of demand, and indeed may
simply induce residents to hold •=foreign" currencies. IO/ Also, a region
may be so open that standard macro-economic fiscal action ceases to be an
effective instrument of demand management, because the great leakages
abroad vitiate its domestic impact. 111 This vitiation of policy is a more
complicated question than at first meets the eye, because of course the
disturbances are also strongly attenuated in these very open economiE~s,
and we must therefore ask whether on balance the region is worse off in
terms of macro-economic management than it would be with more effective
12/
instruments of policy but also with larger net disturbances.But the reduced effectiveness of policy instruments limits the region's
capacity to compensate for disturbances arising outside the region, at least
so long as some social cost is associated with their exercise at more
intensive levels. 131

-9Most of the considerations discussed above--economi es of scale,
external effects, escape from regulation and redistribution, effective
economic stabilization-- argue for increasing the size of jurisdictions.
The entire globe would be the logical limit to this process. Only in
creasing difficulties of management (diseconomies of scale associated
with management and bureaucracy) and, for those regions which can profit
by it, risk-splitting, cut in the other direction, toward smaller seal~
of the optimal jurisdiction. But we have not yet made allowance for
the diversity of preferences for collective goods.
Diversity of preferences.

Individuals differ greatly in their pre

ferences for collective goods, both of the systemic type (i.e. the fun
damental nature of the regime, capitalist or socialist, strong pre
ference for order vs. high respect for individualism, etc.) and for
specific public goods (e.g. provision for flood control or parks or
scientific research). These strong differences are conditioned by dif
ferences in cultural background and in income level. The greater the
diversity of preferences within a given jurisdiction, the more difficult
it will be, obviously, to satisfy all the demands for public goods by
the residents even approximately, since by their nature public goods
are provided in roughly equal amount to all residents of the relevant
area.

There are thus large consumption losses in jurisdictions with a
wide diversity of tastes, relative to what would be possible with different
juiisdictions each catering more precisely to the preferences of its resi
dents. This consideration thus pushes strongly toward relatively small
communities that are homogeneous in their preferences for collective goods;
it underlies much of the pressure for greater decentralizatio n of govern
ment and more local control.
In a recent b'(ok on Size and Democracy, two political scientists
pose the trade-off in a slightly different way. They point to the con
flict between "system capacity" and "citizen effectiveness, 11 that is,.
the capacity of the governmental system to deliver the (public) goods
efficiently, as against the ability of its citizens to participate ef
fectively in making governmental decisions affecting the level and com
position of public goods to be provided. They do at one point seem to

1.

-lO
s11ggP.st a positive value to diversit y among the citizens hip and to
pluralis m as ,such, however , particu larly to provide an environm ent
favorab le to the dissenti ng citizen (which on one issue or another will
be all of them) and this would suggest enlargin g the jurisdic tion de
spite the advantag es cited above for having commun ities with homogen iety
of tastes. They do not, however , attempt to weigh this desire for
pluralis m against the necessa ry consump tion loss on other public goods
that arises from diversit y in tastes. 141
Conside rations of liberty , however , press for smaller , more numer
ous jurisdic tions. Breton has put the point strongly : "the number of
levels and sizes of units [of governm ent] should be such that for any
level of costs, the power of politici ans--de fined as their capacity to
depart from the preferen ces of citizens --should be minimiz ed. 11151
Those fearful of the coercive powers of the state would set the scale of
jurisdic tions at a low level, even if that meant sacrific ing some eco
nomic efficien cy, for t~e sake of keeping politica ns under check through
competi tion with other jurisdic tions.
Conclus ion: What is the Outimal Area:
How are these conflict ing conside rations to be weighed against one
another? That itself is an issue involvin g the. diversit y of preferen ces,
for differen t individu als will be willing to sacrific e differin g amounts
of income (as taxes) in the form of less efficien t provisio n of conven
tional public goods in order to purchase some given amount of liberty or
nationa l prestige or sense of cultura l identity . It is necessa ry, as
Samuelso n told us all along, to have a social welfare function that
weights not only the provisio n of goods and services but also the individ 
uals that make up the communi ty. But to say we need a social welfare
function , while formally correct , merely passes the question to the agent
who specifie s that function ,
Functio nal federali sm.
is possibl e.

Compromise among the various conside rations
Under a system of function al federalis m~ the trade-o ff be

tween scale economie s and diversi ty of tastes is made for each public
good separate ly, leading to many overlapp ing governm ental jurisdic tions,
each dealing with its own set of highly speciali zed and closely related
problem s: police protecti on, weather forecast ing and control ,flood control .
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Each has its own autonomou s decision-m aking structure and its own citizenry ,
which may differ from issue to issue. This in a way is the method of
specializ ed internatio nal organizat ions, each establish ed by separate
.
16/
treaties, and it can also be seen
in federal countrie s.It is an
attractiv e idea, and in practice it will be necessary , at least in some
degree. The notion of sovereign ty inevitabl y becomes ambiguous under a
system of functiona l federalism , for there is no Sovereign , only a series
of partial sovereign ties. But that ambiguity is necessary to achieve the
objective of the optimal provision of public goods, unless of course the
existence of an unambiguo us sovereign ty is itself regarded as the over-ridi ng
public good.
However, a system of functiona l federalism with partial sovereign ties
has its disadvant ages as well. In the first place, both technolog y and
tastes are in flux.

A pattern of organizat ion that is optimal now will in
general not be optimal ten years from now. Yet an on-going bureaucra cy
develops vested interests of its own and is very difficult to change. Every
country is living with outdated but durable-- not to say tenacious -
governme ntal institutio ns. Flexibili ty would be lost through a prolifer
ation of jurisdict ions, none with over-ridi ng authority .
In the second place, a system of functiona l federalism would inhibit
bargainin g and political compromis e across functiona l jurisdict ional
boundarie s in the absence of a higher authority willing and able to sac
rifice the ~·ested interests in particula r jurisdict ions. For much c,f the
time it is useful to have each issue operate on its own track, with its
own set of conventio ns and sanctions to influence behavior. But from time
to time the inability to bargain across issue areas would prevent communit ies
from reaching an optimal configura tion of public goods.
Contempo rary Relevance . I will close with some comments oa the con
temporary relevance of what are otherwise broad and largely inconclus ive
generaliz ations.
The pressures for enlargeme nt of governme ntal jurisdict ions are
strong and growing in the modern world. Activitie s in each jurisdict ion
have impacts on other jurisdict ions in an increasin g number of areas.
Economies of scale and externali ties in some activitie s have been growing

-12as well, so to the extent those activities are desired as public goods,
the jurisdiction required to carry them with any efficiency has also
increased in size.

Not the least of the sources of "spillouts" in the
modern world is the fact that governments have beco~e active in pursuit
of a variety of social objectives, and these pursuits often vary from
country to country, setting up strains, including those arising from the
mobility of firms and persons, between different jurisdictions. Even
when factor mobility is not present, one hears charges of "unfair" com
petition from a country that pursues practices somewhat different from
one's own. Economic stabilization and income redistribution have become
more difficult for countries to achieve acting alone. On all these grounds,
therefore, an argument can be made for increasing the size of jurisdictions-
for forming regional groupings out of nations.
The European Economic Community is one response to these pressures.
The motivations behind the formation of the Community are many, and are
mainly political; but at their root was a perception that European nations
acting one by one would have a diminishing influence on the course of world
events, and hence even on their own welfare, so they joined together to
pool their influence and to try to restore some autonomy to their e,,olution.
The Community is relatively homogeneous by global standards, so the
welfare loss associated with "harmonizing" various policies will be less
than it would be for a larger and more diverse group of countries. Other
successful attempts at economic integration--th e Central American Common
Market, and on a more limited basis the Andean group of countries--also re
flect a high degree of homogeneity relative to the world at large--although
we should keep in mind that homogeneity always looks greater from a distance
than it really is. The United States has been relatively successful in part
because, while very large, it is relatively homogeneous in taste and outlook,
and it has a system of decentralized government capable of catering to
variations in local preferences. Indeed, the greatest internal difficulties
within the United States have arisen when local preferences, e.g. on
racial discrimination , offend a national norm.
Growing centralization and bureaucraticiza tion in response to pressures
for enlargement have created counter-pressur es for greater decentralizatio n
in governmental decision-making .

These arise partly out of psychological
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revulsion at the growing distance between the average citizen and his
government, partly out of the perception that centralization really
reduces responsiveness to local preferences.
The communist countries are committed to such a fundamentally dif
ferent conception of the basic economic regime that it is difficult to
contemplate meaningful integration between those countries and other
countries except along highly specialized and functional lines.

Many less

developed countries are still groping for the appropriate underlying
regime for themselves, trying to adapt a colonial legacy to new needs and
to indigenous preferences, and until this process is completed it will
be difficult to integrate such countries with others whose basic regime
is settled and is generally regarded as satisfactory.

Once again, :lnte

gration along specialized functional lines is about all one should reason
ably try at this stage, and even there such attempts as have been made are
often plagued by difficulties because some countries question the funda
mental propositions that others take for granted.
For these various reasons, therefore, regional integration regarding
public goods seems to be a more promising route than does global integration.
Indeed, there should be no objection to groups of countries getting to
gether to pursue their common interests, so long as neither their intent
nor their effect is gain at the expense of other countries.

There are

numerous opportunities for such "clubs" to form which are not at the expense
of other countries, and indeed their activities may be beneficial tn others.
I conclude therefore in the same way Alec Cairncross did in his recent
discussion of the optimal firm: there is no such thing. 171 Nor is there
such a thing as an optimal region, at least at the high level of generality
that has been considered here.

Not the least of the difficulties is that

close cooperation among nations or within regions builds close ties and
more homogeneous preferences as well as reflecting them, a point well per
ceived by the advocates of the economic route to political unification
of Europe.

Rather, optimality calls for a much more complex array of

jurisdictions, compromising between the desire for greater decentralization
and the technical need for greater centralization in decision-making.
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A recent example of this process was the proposal by the new Labour
government in Britain in 1974 to tax the total income of foreign residents
in Britain. The proposal was greeted with howls of protest, some foreign
residents made their plans to leave, and the British government backed
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